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Manifestations of water scarcity seem to be increasingly frequent, even in regions with 
temperate climates and endowed with good water resources. Population growth, poor 
management, climatic change or vagaries of weather, the growing needs of cities or the 
allegedly excessive share of water used in agriculture, are some of the reasons 
commonly cited as the roots of water scarcity. This paper argues that several 'bad good 
reasons' and mechanisms are at work to generate 'overbuilt basins,' whereby the 
development of infrastructural resources invariably tends to outstrip available resources. 
Despite its crucial importance and ubiquity, this phenomenon is often overlooked. 
Eight main drivers of basin overbuilding are proposed and discussed. They draw our 
attention to the artificial nature of water scarcity and to how project planning may (and 
tend to) acquire a life of its own, overriding criteria of hydrologic or economic 
relevance. Overextended facilities beget water shortages and water shortages call for 
more water resources development that will come with more diversions and uses. Such 
processes have deep implications for policymaking and it is argued that unpacking the 
reasons why 'enough is never enough,' that is, why water resources become 






Recurring accounts of water conflicts between countries, economic sectors or within 
irrigation schemes suggest that there is simply not enough water for all. Population 
growth, poor management, climatic change or vagaries of weather, or the growing needs 
of cities are some of the reasons commonly cited as the roots of water scarcity. With its 
'lion's share' of 80% of diverted waters, and a higher percentage in many developing 
countries, irrigation is also often painted as the villain of the piece: Farmers allegedly 
‘guzzle’ water while wasting a large part of it and depriving other users of needed 
resources. Yet, in many irrigation schemes a large proportion of the land often remains 
uncultivated in the dry season for lack of water. In some years, even reducing irrigation's share or discontinuing supply altogether does not prevent some cities from 
having their supply rationed. 
This state of affairs, in a situation where the amount of renewable resources remains by 
and large the same,
2 questions the origin of water scarcity. This paper argues that 
several 'bad good reasons' and mechanisms are at work to generate 'overbuilt basins,' 
whereby the development of infrastructural resources invariably tends to outstrip 
available resources. Despite its crucial importance and ubiquity, this phenomenon is 
often overlooked. 
Water scarcity thus appears as artificially created rather than the mere result of fatality. 
Eight main drivers of basin overbuilding are discussed in what follows: they do not, of 
course, entail that projects are necessarily unjustified, undesirable, or biased. They 
merely draw our attention to how project planning may (and tend to) acquire a life of its 
own, overriding criteria of hydrologic or economic relevance. This has implications for 
policymaking and it is argued that unpacking the reasons why 'enough is never enough,' 
that is, why water resources become overcommitted and river basins overbuilt, is critical 
if these mechanisms are to be countered. 
Engendering water scarcity 
* The political economy of river basin development 
The most obvious driver of water resources development is the convergence of interests 
of all influential actors. a) The state sees large-scale projects as political icons that build 
up legitimacy and political support from beneficiaries, while assisting in alleviating 
poverty in rural areas. b) State line agencies, notably those involved in construction, 
consider the ever-continuation of projects as a professional necessity and as a way to 
perpetuate themselves and their budget. Examples from the US, Europe or Australia 
show that these agencies transformed themselves into environmental agencies when 
more construction became simply impossible.
3 c) Local politicians regard subsidized 
projects as means to ‘create a powerful supportive constituency that will ensure political 
control over many years’ (O'Mara,1990). d) Private construction companies and 
consultants take them as business opportunities and often have the political clout and 
linkages to push for such projects (Scudder, 1994). e) For development banks, big 
projects hold the promise of concrete and large-scale changes, maximizing aid flow 
while minimizing project management costs (Howe & Dixon, 1993). 
This convergence of interests easily generates powerful coalitions (Moore, 1990) that 
are seldom challenged and even more rarely defeated. While there is nothing inherently 
wrong in having different actors joining forces towards a common goal, the financial 
and political private benefits and rewards of such projects have often fostered rent-
seeking behaviors, as cogently illustrated by Repetto (1986). In public administrations 
such behaviors may be encouraged by low salaries (Mathur, 2004). In the US, the so-
called ‘iron-triangle’ linking state politicians, federal agencies and private companies 
has long been famous for blurring the frontier between private and public benefits 
(Gottlieb, 1988; Worster, 1985; Briscoe, 1999
4). Logrolling, or the trading of votes 
between legislators pushing for their own project (the ‘Thou shall not attack a project 
from another district’ principle, see Gottlieb, 1988) has, in particular, come to be one 
powerful engine behind water resources overdevelopment. In sum, ’irrigation is so 
obviously a good thing, who can be against it?’ (Berkoff, 2002). * Ideology and state building 
Gigantic and prestigious engineering and technological feats have always been key 
elements of state building, flattering national pride, aggrandizing national leaders, and 
bringing legitimacy to rulers (Molle, 2006a). Just as Nehru famously spoke of dams as 
the ‘modern temples of India,’ big dams and irrigation schemes were seen as heralding 
modernity and delivering development and prosperity: the Guezira scheme in British 
Sudan would remain in history as a ‘great romance of creative achievement’ (Ertsen, 
2006), while the French sought to restore ‘Rome granary’ in Morocco. Many rulers 
would picture themselves as new pharaohs mastering the whims of nature and presiding 
over the destiny of their people. 
This crave for modernity and gigantism was accompanied, or fuelled, by a vibrant 
ideology of domination of nature which has its roots in the Enlightenment and in 19th 
century scientism, and blossomed during the 1930-1970 period (Molle, 2006b). 
Inaugurating the iconic Boulder dam, Theodore Roosevelt declared that ‘pridefully, man 
acclaims his conquest over nature.’ In virtually all countries nature was conceived as a 
threatening wilderness that needed to be tamed or subdued. In the Soviet Union, Gorki 
would support the plan to ‘make mad rivers sane’ (McCully, 2001), in France the 
Compagnie Nationale du Rhône would fight an ‘epic battle against nature’ and the 
‘furious bull leaping from the Alpes’ [the Rhône river] (Pritchard, 2004), while Mao 
declared a ‘war against nature.’ In South Africa, scientists called for rivers to be ‘tamed 
and domesticated’ so that ‘deserts [could be] turned into gardens’ (Turton et al., 2004). 
In Brazil, engineers and politicians drew inspiration from the Bureau of Reclamation in 
the US and launched a massive construction of reservoirs in the northeastern region of 
the country under the banner of the ‘hydraulic solution’ (solução hidráulica) (Guerra & 
Guerra, 1980). Mexico proclaimed its plan to ‘win over nature’ (vencer a la 
naturaleza). In his recent celebration of the Three Gorges dam of the Yangtze river, 
President Zemin (1997) also referred to the ‘ancient Chinese people's indomitable spirit 
in successfully conquering nature.’ 
Nothing in the ingenuity, labor and idealism invested in such projects must, of course, 
be belittled; they have indeed contributed to material progress and comfort based on 
electricity, water supply or irrigated food production. With hindsight, however, this 
particular conception of nature as an enemy to be subdued has contributed to fuelling 
massive projects which have been blind to our interdependence with ecosystems and 
which have undermined our own resource base. Associated with the ubiquitous design 
to not let a single drop of water be ‘lost’ to the sea, this dream of fully controlling nature 
has contributed to the overdevelopment of river basins (Molle, 2006b). 
* Fuzziness of water rights and double accounting 
An important aspect of basin overbuilding is the imprecise or faulty nature of 
hydrologic knowledge, which lends itself to a degree of manipulation, when it is not 
simply overlooked. There is no shortage of projects with optimistic assumptions on 
basin runoff and of dams which have never filled up to the expected level. Even when 
hydrology was better known and a system of water rights designed, experience shows 
that the tendency (that minimizes political stress) of over-allocating water in order to 
satisfy more users has been hard to escape (e.g. in Australia, rights had to be bought 
back or capped). The review by Molle & Berkoff (2006) of the conflict between cities and irrigation 
showed that many cities reappropriate surface water or groundwater used by farmers 
either surreptitiously or with purposive omission of hydrological impacts on third 
parties: diversions invariably concern ‘surplus water’ (even when coming from dams 
with hardly any spillage, as in the case of the diversion from Veeranam tank to 
Chennai) and ‘preserve’ the needs of existing users (like the water from El Cuchillo 
dam diverted for human consumption of Monterrey, in Mexico) despite preexisting 
downstream use for irrigation.
5 Double accounting of available resources is a common 
feature; in Algeria, for example, the World Bank supported both irrigation projects and 
urban water supply networks in competition for the same scarce resource (Winpenny, 
1994). 
Popular thinking tends to see sciences like hydrology as ‘hard’, neutral, authoritative, 
and beyond value judgment but differences in expert judgment on issues like estimating 
groundwater recharge, safe yields or even stocks, for example, show otherwise.
6 Our 
understanding of hydrology, and in particular of its stochastic nature, is always partial 
and sometimes crude. Scientific assessments or feasibility studies are also influenced by 
beliefs, viewpoints and ideology (see, for example, diverging impact assessments of the 
south-north interbasin transfer in China in Berkoff, 2003, or in Hill et al., 2003 for 
European cases). This hydrological uncertainty leaves room for interest groups to justify 
marginal projects in conditions of incipient basin closure. 
* The malleability of cost-benefit analysis 
It is nothing novel for anybody involved in project design that cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA) are malleable. Anticipated values of yields, cropping patterns, or market prices 
fall between wide open brackets and may vary widely (Berkoff, 2002). Categories of 
cost, benefit, life duration, discount rate, etc. can be manipulated to obtain very 
contrasting results (Ingram, 1971; Tiffen, 1987). While some acknowledge that the 
CBA are easily ‘corrupted,’ others consider the variable results as a product of 
incompetence or bias, not a weakness of the method (Williams, 1972). It provides 
scientific support and legitimization, a sense of ‘mechanical objectivity’ that seemed to 
override the passions and interests that informed political debate (Porter, 1995), but may 
serve as a powerful tool ‘to clothe politically desirable projects in the fig leaf of 
economic respectability’ (Marshall, 1965). Despite these alleged limitations and 
manipulations, the CBA may still allow one to identify and weed out projects that are 
absurd from an economic point of view (Ingram, 1997). 
The history of cost-benefit analysis shows that two devices have been—quite early in 
the US—designed in order to come up with acceptable cost-benefit ratios for projects 
that had been turned down earlier. According to Porter (1995) ‘the Corps [Army Corps 
of Engineers] was engaged in a perpetual effort to push back the frontiers of cost-benefit 
analysis so that there would always be a manageable supply of economically approved 
projects.’ As early as the 1940s, this led the Corps to considering five classes of 
‘extended benefits radiating outward’ categorized as merchandizing, direct processing, 
other stages of processing, wholesale trade and retail trade. 
The Bureau of Reclamation exhibited similar ‘accounting inventiveness’ in making 
‘intangible benefits’ tangible and quantified (Porter, 1995). It also resorted to what was 
called ‘river basin accounting,’ and was an early attempt to expand cost-benefit analysis 
to multipurpose water resource development projects. In the early 1940s, according to Reisner (1986), by considering an entire basin as an integrated project and pooling all 
benefits (e.g. irrigation, navigation, hydropower, etc.) together, the Bureau was able to 
further projects which would not make economic sense if considered in isolation. 
Irrigation costs, for example, could be offset by hydropower benefits.
7
Such devices did not remain confined to the US but it seems that the CBA in developing 
countries have been the object of much less scrutiny and debate, making these devices 
generally unnecessary (for an example in Sri Lanka, see Molle & Renwick, 2005). 
Internal incentives in development banks have generated a pressure to lend
8 which has 
fostered what has been called ‘irrigation optimism’ (Jones, 1995), as well as distorted 
economic analyses, as indicated by ex-post studies on irrigation investments which in a 
large majority of cases found shortfall in internal rate of returns (ADB, 1986, 1995; 
World Bank, 1986; Jones, 1995). 
* Regional politics: equity and/or the 'grab-it-first' strategy 
Overbuilding of river basins is also often promoted by political and socioeconomic 
concerns for poorer regions, which lag behind other parts of a country and display 
higher levels of poverty. Politicians from these regions are likely to stress that other 
areas with stronger comparative advantages (for example, in terms of soil, water or 
linkages with markets) have benefited from earlier priority investments, and that 
concern for equity or poverty alleviation demands similar investments to be extended to 
other regions. Such demands often gain strength when local politicians are associated 
with the ruling party and expect a reward for their support. 
State government may also be sympathetic to such demand when problems of migration 
affect the capital or the largest cities. Objectives of reduction of urban marginality and 
poverty prompt large-scale rural projects to retain the local population and spur regional 
development. 
When earlier investments have benefited areas located at the downstream extremity of a 
river basin (typically large fertile plains and deltas), upper regions claim that they have 
been discriminated against and that the river traversing their land is also ‘theirs.’ This 
leads to further development plans in subregions with sometimes only marginal land 
and to tap resources that are already partly appropriated by downstream users (Molle, 
2003). Benefits are spread and equity enhanced but at the cost of basic economic 
principles, since late developments reduce the economic return of downstream facilities: 
benefits are merely shifted spatially and investments made redundant. 
In addition, projects propelled by populist arguments are also frequently overextended 
in order to distribute benefits to the largest number of people, thus maximizing political 
reward. Likewise, new dams constructed for flood control or for easing water shortages 
will almost invariably have their attendant irrigated areas because of the necessity to 
raise the project internal rate of return and to offer compensation to the province which 
will support the consequences of flooding at the dam site. These processes contribute to 
increasing diversions and to basin closure. 
A variant of this situation can be found in federal states where this balancing between 
regions is harder to achieve. States sharing the same river basin and do not depending 
on the center's fund for construction will tend to rush to develop water resources before 
other states do. In the absence of sharing agreements (such as the compact between 
states in the US), or of enforcement of these agreements, this ‘blue rush’ will fuel overdevelopment, with upstream states developing infrastructures to use water that is 
already (at least in part) used by downstream areas. Typical instances of such a situation 
can be found in the Krishna and Cauvery basins in India. 
* Low risk, high subsidies 
Development of public irrigation schemes is highly subsidized. Only in a very few cases 
have irrigators paid a small portion of investment costs and, in most cases, cost-
recovery does not even cover O&M costs. Such projects developed at taxpayer expense 
are therefore much in ‘demand’ by local authorities and politicians, and sometimes local 
populations. Many economists argue that if users were made to pay the full costs (or to 
start with the full O&M costs) there would be much less ‘demand’ for them (Repetto, 
1986). 
Although it is clear that sunk costs of past projects will never be repaid (Garrido, 2002), 
a number of countries like Turkey, Spain or Australia have tried to change the rules and 
to make cost-sharing of future projects compulsory. 
Since projects are funded with public money, possible failures carry less consequence 
than for private investors. This is paralleled with the fact that main international 
development banks face no sanction for failed or under-optimal projects, since they are 
assured to be reimbursed. As mentioned earlier, this has fostered what has been called a 
‘lending culture’ which has also fuelled the design of projects with modest economic 
potential. 
* The push factor of agrarian pressure and shock events  
The responses and behavior of water users and of the society at large to water-related 
problems depend on their perception of the magnitude and seriousness of these 
problems. This perception, in turn, is often sharply influenced by extreme natural 
events, such as typhoons, droughts and floods, which are generally accompanied by 
food shortage, disasters and the disruption of livelihoods. 
Shock events often allow governments to impose policies that would otherwise have 
been unpopular and opposed. Allan (1999) remarked that politicians are more likely to 
wait for the exhaustion of resources and the surge of crises before embarking on 
draconian reforms. Indeed drought crises are often manufactured (Mehta, 2001) or used 
as compelling proofs that the ‘balance between supply and demand has been lost’ and 
that supply needs to be increased. Projects of interbasin transfers or reservoirs that have 
often been considered during decades are rekindled. Water shortages in big cities create 
a psychological context where costly projects can be justified and launched. 
Rural poverty can also be a strong driver of basin overdevelopment. Governments faced 
with prospects of famine or social unrest and secondary/tertiary sectors unable to absorb 
growing rural populations found themselves in a situation where the main way out was 
massive investment in water and other rural infrastructures. The El-Niño-related 
climatic perturbation of 1972, which severely affected grain production and sent prices 
rocketing up, combined a climatic shock event with fear of rural disintegration. The 
psychological impact of this event on both national decision makers and western 
countries (engaged in the Cold War and bent on investing in countries potentially 
threatened by the spread of communism) was so high that much of the huge investments in dams and irrigation infrastructures that were to follow can be ascribed to the threat of 
food shortage in the particular geopolitical context of the time (Barker & Molle, 2004). 
In such situations, economic or hydrologic rationality is neither here nor there and 
infrastructures are designed to benefit the larger number of people and are therefore 
often overextended: this will increase the frequency and impact of coming shortages. 
Large tracts of these projects will remain uncultivated, and the images of parched fields 
and cracked soils will hit the news and trigger calls for more water resources 
development. 
* Lopsided governance and weak participation:  
A last reason why basin overbuilding occurs is the lack of openness in decision-making 
and, in many cases, the absence of participation of the segments of the population which 
are to be affected by the project, as well as the weak defense of environmental integrity. 
It is commonplace that feasibility studies or environmental impact assessments are not 
made public. Presentation and discussion of alternatives, identification of likely impacts 
with concerned populations, distribution of costs and benefits, and compensation 
schemes, are examples of issues that are imperfectly considered, if at all. 
Experts too often insulate themselves from public debate on the basis that issues are too 
complex or technical to be understood by the layman. By suggesting that arguments are 
merely technical they close and depoliticize the debate. 
Yet, river basin development appears to be a political process where asymmetries of 
information do not facilitate informed and inclusive processes of decision making. The 
financial and political interests involved tend to push for a hasty completion of the 
project. These interest groups easily convince themselves that they work for the 
common good but experience shows that losers tend to be first overlooked and then 
forgotten if they do not have political channels to make sure their rights are being taken 
into consideration. Since projects increasingly affect third parties and the environment 
as a basin closes, inadequate governance patterns tend to let the driving forces of basin 
overbuilding go unchecked. 
Conclusions 
Basin overbuilding and basin closure have occurred in many basins such as the 
Colorado, Yellow river, Amu-Daria/Syr-Daria, Jordan, Cauvery, and many rivers of 
Mexico, Iran, etc. Such processes seem to be on their way in the Ganges, Indus, 
Krishna, Nile and other river basins.
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The overcommitment of water resources in a given river basin may also be the result of 
uncoordinated and unchecked individual diversions of surface water or abstraction of 
groundwater. We have focused here on large-scale irrigation schemes, reservoirs and 
other infrastructures built and managed by state agencies, but it is worth mentioning that 
basin closure can also be compounded, and sometimes driven, by the development of 
diffuse individual or small-scale irrigation. This is the case in the Krishna basin and 
many Indian catchments where areas irrigated by wells and/or equipped with water 
harvesting structures have outstripped public irrigation areas. 
Yet, large-scale water resources development is the chief driver of the closure of most 
basins: it is in the planning and decision-making process that the drivers of the overbuilding of river basins lie, whereby scarcity and crises are first generated by 
overextended facilities and then used to justify further storage or transfers. This self-
sustaining vicious circle has led many basins to close, with a critical impact on 
ecosystems and increased vulnerability of users to variability in supply. 
This draws our attention to the artificial nature of water scarcity when generated by 
overbuilding of river basins. Discussing and designing new policies and projects in 
response to water problems are paramount; yet, it is equally important to comprehend 
how and why we got there. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Senior researcher at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, 911 Avenue Agropolis, 34000 
Montpellier, France; joint appointment with the International Water Management Institute. 
f.molle@cgiar.org  
2 Climate change does increase climatic variability and affects hydrology but the discussion here is 
focused on human-induced scarcity. 
3 In the US it was only in 1993, in a landmark statement, that the Bureau of Reclamation publicly 
announced that ‘Federally-funded irrigation water supply projects [would] not be initiated in the future’, 
marking a dramatic end of its historical mission (Postel, 1999). 
4 ‘Rent-seeking behavior is deeply embedded in the social and political fabric of all major irrigating 
countries and thus changes only slowly and usually because of major exogenous threats.’ 
5 President Salinas’ speech for the inauguration of El Cuchillo dam on October 17, 1994 was typical of 
the way politicians like to frame projects in terms of administrative state boundaries rather than in terms 
of hydrological ones, overlooking interactions that will however soon surface: Salinas declared that ‘El 
Cuchillo dam is a project of Nuevo Leon and for Nuevo Leon, which will solve future water supply’ 
(Barajas 1999). 
6 A striking example is that of the planned abstraction of an aquifer in the Mojave desert, in California, 
where experts of the private company proposing the project put estimates of the recharge rate at ten times 
that assessed by the US Geological Survey… (Booth, 2002). 
7 According to Reisner (1986), irrigation development was ‘pursued with near fanaticism, until the most 
gigantic dams were being built on the most minuscule foundations of economic rationality and need.’ 
8 In 1992, the Wapenhans Commission found that ‘pressure to lend’ was undermining the rigor of 
appraisals and project quality. 
9 With the ambitious plan to develop more irrigated areas in the North Sinai and southern Egypt an 
additional 10 Bm
3 of Nile basin water will be extracted, that is, almost 20 percent of Egypt’s 
internationally negotiated share of the annual storage releases from Lake Nasser (USAID, 2002). Flows to 
the northern Lakes, which are already polluted and where fisheries are declining are unlikely to receive 
water in adequate quantity and quality, and seawater intrusion into coastal groundwater will increase. 
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